SNB - 5-2020 - art. 13


S T U D I A N A D B E Z P I E C Z E Ń S T W E M
Nr 5	ss. 197–210	2020

ISSN 2543–7321		Przyjęto:	15.12.2020
© Instytut Bezpieczeństwa i Zarządzania, Akademia Pomorska w Słupsku		Zaakceptowano:	15.12.2020
Oryginalna praca badawcza		DOI: 10.34858/SNB.1.2020.013

Anatoliy Kalyayev

Lviv Regional Institute for Public Administration of the National Academy for Public Administration under the President of Ukraine

ORCID: 0000-0002-5675-187X

e-mail: toldek@ukr.net

EUROPEAN REALITIES OF COLLECTIVE DEFENCE:

NATO AND EU RELATIONSHIP ISSUES

EUROPEJSKIE REALIA OBRONY ZBIOROWEJ:

KWESTIE STOSUNKÓW NATO I UE

Zarys treści: Biorąc pod uwagę nowe wyzwania i zagrożenia geopolityczne, UE szuka spo- sobów, aby im przeciwdziałać, reformując swoje struktury bezpieczeństwa i obrony. Ważnym aspektem jest budowa wspólnej polityki UE i NATO. Europejska Strategia Bezpieczeństwa była ważnym krokiem na drodze do znaczącej zbieżności stanowisk NATO i UE. Udowodniono, że skuteczna współpraca między NATO i UE jest kluczem do wypracowania zintegrowanego podejścia do zarządzania kryzysowego i operacji, które wymagają efektywnego wykorzystania zarówno środków wojskowych, jak i cywilnych. Proponuje się, aby Ukraina w najbliższym czasie zgodziła się na propozycję NATO i przyjęła format „partnerstwa stowarzyszonego”, tj. kontynuowała kurs ewentualnego zbliżenia z NATO bez formalnego przystąpienia. Rozwój autonomicznych europejskich struktur obronnych otwiera przed Ukrainą możliwość dalszego pogłębiania współpracy z UE i równoległego wzmacniania zdolności obronnych.

Słowa kluczowe: bezpieczeństwo międzynarodowe, obrona zbiorowa, NATO, UE, Europejska Strategia Bezpieczeństwa, współpraca

Key words: international security, collective defence, NATO, EU, European security strategy, cooperation.

Problem statement

Security governance in today’s world is perceived as one of the most impor- tant aspects of governments’ and states’ functions to prevent global wars and avoid regional conflicts, which, given their specific means and methods, can lead to the destruction of civilization and life on our planet. Current world events, namely,

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a number of armed confrontations in different regions, the intensification of separatist movements, centrifugal tendencies characteristic of the positions of individual mem- ber states of integration structures, have highlighted the problem of imperfections of historically formed global and regional security systems which, in the second half of the 20th century, functioned on the basis of implementation of the principle of invio- lability of states’ territorial integrity and borders following the Second World War. At the turn of the 20th – 21st centuries, international security structures faced the task of counteracting hybrid war and information sabotage, which provides financial, mi- litary and diplomatic support to destructive forces in different countries. These forces bring chaos to political processes, provoke distrust of existing political institutions and threaten not only the principles of international law, but also the very existence of the modern world order. Awareness of the responsibility of global governance for choosing the most effective approaches and principles of regional and global inte- gration structures and security systems, compatible and capable of interaction at the global level, necessitates the development of theoretical concepts, the implementation of which in practice can secure the future of humanity based on consolidated achieve- ments of international experience. In this regard, the experience of addressing issues of war, peace and security is of particular importance, as a value that states are called to preserve and protect at the national, global and regional levels. Given the new geopolitical challenges and threats, the main reason for which is the desire of political players to reconsider their spheres of influence, the EU has been the target of both political and armed attacks, the main purpose of which is to disrupt the consolidated system of the Union governance. With this in mind, the EU is looking for ways to co- unter this by reforming its security and defence structures and achieving a high level of consolidation in their management. Meanwhile, despite the existence of a common goal, there are some contradictions between the EU countries, integration and national security institutions regarding the reformation process, contributions of individual co- untries to the common defence budget, and so on. In this context, an important aspect is the construction of a common EU and NATO policy, where the main cause of dif- ferences is the position of the United States as the main military force of the Alliance. This calls for an analysis of the current state of NATO-EU relations in the context of identifying ways to create an effective collective defence system.

The issue of coverage in the scientific literature

Security and defence issues are constantly at the centre of the scientific ommunity’s attention. Given the interdisciplinary nature of the issue, it can be noted that the con- ceptual foundations of international security have been studied in the works of We- stern authors, in particular, R. Aron, Z. Brzezinski, D. Baldwin, K. Deutsch, E. Carr, E. Carter, G. Clark, J. Kennan, R. Keohain, G. Kissinger, S. Hoffman, H. Mackinder, E. Mansfield, M. Mikhalka, D. Miltrani, G. Morgenthau, J. Nay, R. Niebuhr, W. Perry, J. Rosenau, J. Snyder, J. Steinbrunner, L. Son, K. Waltz, M. Howorth, V. Mandragelya,

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L. Novak-Kalyayeva, D. Shay, S.Walt, N. Witney and others. A number of Ukrainian authors have devoted their works to addressing some specific problems of development of European countries, including integration, security issues, geopolitical and politi- cal aspects: Yu. Borko, O. Bursov, L. Vorobyova, A. Galchynsky, O. Goncharenko, K. Grishchenko, V. Gorbulin, V. Dergachev, T. Zakaurtseva, T. Zonova, I. Kuzmin, O. Litvinenko, O. Manachynsky, I. Hraban, V. Chi, V. Shakhov, A. Shevtsova and others.

At the same time, in the conditions of permanent changes in the nature of armed confrontation, constant improvement of attack and defence means and escalating ter- rorist threats, the research of tasks and approaches to global strategic management in the security field acquires special importance. This confirms the relevance of the topic of the article and the timeliness of further scientific development of selected issues.

The main reasons for the change of priorities in EU security policy

Turning to the origins of European security, it can be stated that the system of in- ternational and European security has largely depended on the positions of Germany, Britain, France, the United States and Russia, which have mainly been the initiators or actors in wars and conflicts in recent history in their desire for world leadership. In historical retrospect, these countries have constantly created military-political al- liances, which were aimed at taking foreign territories and wealth, so their policy was aggressive and offensive. Their adversaries, however, created defensive alliances and collective security systems that were ineffective due to the constant struggle for geopolitical influence.

Since the end of World War II, the American military presence, and especially NATO’s nuclear component, has ensured the security of NATO allies based on the principles of collective and territorial defence. Under the de facto military and politi- cal patronage of the United States, the level of economic development, quality of life, civil rights and freedoms in the European Union have reached the highest standards in the world. That is why the countries of Western Europe have not formed a common policy in the field of foreign policy, security and defence. Concentrating integration processes in the socio-economic and socio-political spheres, they did not see an urgent need to intensify their efforts in this area, given the guarantees of NATO1.

The process of European countries’ security integration began with the conclusion of the Brussels Treaty on March 17, 1948, between Belgium, Great Britain, Luxem- bourg, the Netherlands and France, which envisaged joint activities in the economic, social and cultural spheres and collective self-defence. In the early 1950s Europe created its own security structure. On May 27, 1952, the Treaty on the European Defence Community (EEC) was signed by Belgium, Italy, Luxembourg, the Nether- lands, France and Germany. The European defence community had a “supranational character,” common institutions, armed forces and a budget. The main goals of the

1S. Walt (2005). Taming American Power: The Global Response to US Primacy. New York: Nor- ton. P. 129.

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WEU include “…providing military and other mutual assistance both in support of international peace and security and in counteracting any aggressive policy; promoting the unity of Europe; close cooperation with NATO; strengthening and ensuring democracy, personal and political freedom, constitutional traditions, re- spect for the law; establishing closer economic, social and cultural ties between the member states. The WEU contributed to the formation of the institutional foundations of the common security and defence policy. Although the formation of the European security system was carried out by European countries that were members of the EU, the European security policy was conducted on the basis of NATO. One of the main tasks of the EU, defined by the Maastricht Treaty of 7 Februa- ry 1992, is to pursue a common foreign security and defence policy. At the same time, the development and formation of such security policy took place through the joint efforts of the EU and NATO. The EU and NATO established a formal relationship in January 2001. On 16 December 2002, the EU-NATO Declaration on a Common Euro- pean Security and defence Policy (CEPS, ESDP) was adopted. These steps testified to a certain correction of the worldview of the political leadership of EU countries and the gradual strengthening of the intentions to develop the concept of security directly focused on the European political space and realization of the collective interests of EU states in the field of international security. The most important document for the development of the European collective security system at the beginning of the 21st century was the European Security Strategy (ECS) adopted in December 2003.

Meanwhile, at the turn of the century, both the new US position and the EU’s aspiration to become an independent centre of power with its own course in world politics, capable of defending its interests, began to take shape, leading to a re- vision of the EU’s position. At the same time, the rapid enlargement of the EU slowed down the process of coordinating the efforts of European countries in the field of security and defence. V. Mandragelya singles out three waves of reforms of the EU security system. Initially (during 2003–2005), attention was focused on the development of comprehensive anti-crisis management. In 2006–2008, the main ef- forts were focused on improving structures and strengthening the capabilities of crisis management. Since mid-2008, another trend has emerged: the attempt to adapt the ESDP to a wider political context, to tie the hierarchical structure more closely to the CFSP, to the tools and resources of the European Commission2.

The different interests of EU members, as well as the resources and, more impor- tantly, the different security culture, have become the drivers of institutional reforms in the ESDP3.

Despite the EU’s efforts to achieve greater cooperation in the defence field, there are a number of problems in relations between member states, primarily related to the desire of individual members to share spheres of influence and the cumbersome

V. Mandragelya (2011). European system of collective security: institutional problems Political Management. Pp. 133–140. P. 135 [in Ukrainian].

European Security and Defence Policy (2009). The first 10 Years (1999–2009) / Eds. Giovanni Grevi, Damien Helly and Daniel Keohane. Paris, The European Union for Security Studies, P. 22.

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institutional structure of the security sphere, which leads to problems with making operational military and political decisions.

In addition, the European Union has to compete in the security field with NATO, the OSCE and the UN. These are largely different institutions, with different appro- aches and potentially conflicting interests. Due to the impossibility of resolving se- curity issues between these organizations, in 2006 the EU countries agreed to the so-called “Long Term Vision” (LTV) for the development of opportunities. Particular attention was paid to the means of communication and intelligence, high-precision weapons and means of protection, development of transport and logistics4.

In accordance with the Lisbon Treaty, the ESDP has been renamed the Common Security and defence Policy (CSDP). To succeed, the EU needs to focus on the follo- wing tasks: decisive and urgent actions in key areas of the defence sector; persistent pooling of efforts and resources; improving the efficiency of the European defence Agency (EDA)5.

The European defence Agency (EDA) is a key institution of the European Union in the implementation of measures to provide resources for the Common Security and defence Policy (CFSP). The agency was tasked with developing military resources, defence research and development, pan-European armaments cooperation projects, strengthening the industrial and technological base and, as a main guideline, creating a common competitive market for military and dual-use products. To achieve the go- als of the EOA, strategic initiatives were approved which became the conceptual basis for this body’s activities. However, in recent years, the agency has failed to achieve significant results and has only partially advanced in this direction.

According to most foreign researchers, the main reason for forming the European Security and defence Policy (ESDP) was the hegemonic position of the United States and the desire of Europeans to create an autonomous system of collective security for the EU to pursue its own course in world politics, reduce dependence on the United States and develop capacities to protect their own interests6.

New tasks in the field of collective security and defence in response to the aggressive policy of the Russian Federation

Given the military-political confrontation between Ukraine and the Russian Fede- ration, security issues in Europe have become particularly relevant. The complex rea- sons behind the aforementioned problems includes fear of Russia’s policy in the post- -Soviet space and the position of the new EU members – the former Soviet republics and the former socialist countries of Central and Eastern Europe. Central and Eastern

NATO’s official website November 10, 2010. URL: http://www.nato.int/docu/basictxt/b061129e. htm.

N. Witney (2008). Re-energising Europe’s Security and Defence Policy. London: European Co- uncil on Foreign Relations. Pp. 33–34.

S. Walt (2005). Taming American Power: The Global Response to US Primacy. New York: Nor- ton. P. 129.

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European countries build national security systems based on their own national in- terests, vision and analysis of political processes taking place in the world, political experience and professional competence of political elites. Russia’s partnership with these countries is of a special nature.

Most European countries are members of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization

–NATO. Therefore, the Euro-Atlantic Alliance is an important component of the national security systems of the dominant number of Central and Eastern European countries.

Most Central and Eastern European countries link their security systems to the United States, acknowledging its leading role in international security. The United States has a significant role to play in the Common European Security Policy. NATO’s Euro-Atlantic security system does not cover all countries, thus efforts of all states in the region need to be consolidated in order to prevent conflicts in Europe and beyond its borders. It may be appropriate to raise the issues of returning the OSCE back fun- ctions defined by its constituent documents, and transforming the OSCE into a core element of the regional security system. This will allow the organization to expand its powers to prevent and resolve conflicts, including conduct of peacekeeping opera- tions and improving arms control in the area of responsibility of the OSCE.

In the context of reorienting NATO’s efforts towards collective defence goals, NATO’s day-to-day operations, which include deploying new units in its eastern member countries, conducting extensive training, countering cyber threats and terro- rism, as well as admitting new member states, contradict political claims that NATO it is an outdated alliance that incurs large financial costs. At the same time, many septics believe that its combat effectiveness is low and does not meet requirements, especially after the change in the position of the United States, which began to demand increased expenses for maintaining its structure. Meanwhile, according to European analysts, nowadays the alliance operates in the most complex security environment in its hi- story. It deals with a spectrum of threats more diverse than ever. If it fails to eliminate these threats, they could put an end to the liberal-democratic societies, human rights and freedoms that citizens of NATO member states take for granted today7. NATO’s role should be to actively promote and search for ways to combine different contribu- tions for maximum strategic outcome. As NATO overcomes the challenges of the 21st century, a wide and diverse range of different assets, skills, knowledge, strengths and capabilities can give NATO an advantage over its adversaries.

The alliance’s next area of action is to ensure an extensive and structured partner- ship based on mutual benefit. Partnership with alliance members makes the role of partners in international security more significant. At the same time, shifting NATO’s priorities towards collective defence has put the issue of partnership into the back- ground. Rebuilding partnerships can help convince the public that the alliance has a political rather than a purely military approach to security. And most importantly, when it comes to resolving the issue of European defence in the context of creating

7D. Shei (2019). Alians pereoriientovuie uvahu na svoiu osnovnu misiiu kolektyvnoi oborony. NATO Reviu 30.09.2019. Pp. 10–19. P. 10 [in Ukrainian].

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its own armed forces, the debate over whether there should be a European army or European strategic autonomy does not stop. Some want to strengthen European forces and resources without separate institutions; others - institutions, not caring too much about additional forces and means. It has been claimed for some time that the Europe- an defence structure itself is needed as a safeguard in the event of US withdrawal. At other times, it is seen as a way to strengthen the alliance and the transatlantic partner- ship by overcoming the fragmentation of European defence budgets and procurement programmes and giving the EU more influence by increasing cooperation program- mes. The periodic declarations of individual EU leaders on the creation of a European army look more like another attempt to pretend to be real in the face of problematic decision-making in the EU, and have no prospects in the near future, especially given that the issue of insufficient funding of defence and security needs by European coun- tries has already become a chronic problem for EU member states. Therefore, the in- troduction of stricter security regimes in public places and strengthening cooperation between law enforcement agencies of European countries on combating terrorism, illegal migration, organized crime, drug trafficking, etc. looks really promising8.

The EU today faces new challenges and threats posed by both internal and external factors that are of blurred character due to globalization. This is what forces Europe- ans to take more responsibility for security on and around the continent. The European Security Strategy has become one of the important stages in the substantial conver- gence of NATO and EU positions. Effective cooperation between NATO and the EU is the key to developing an integrated approach to crisis management and conducting operations, which requires the effective use of both military and civilian means. The prospects for creating a reliable future European security system largely depend on how quickly Europe can draw the appropriate conclusions from the current crisis and make adequate decisions9.

Implementation of the EU and NATO common security policy

The EU Security and Defence Policy is part of the Common Foreign and Se- curity Policy (CFSP). Under the Lisbon Treaty, the CFSP actually consists of two parts: the common foreign policy and its autonomous component, the Europe- an Security and Defence Policy (CSDP). Bloody conflicts on the borders of the EU have made the security issue a weak point of the European integration proje- ct. At present Europe is in a “ring of fire” that runs through the Middle East and the Caucasus and reaches the borders of Ukraine. According to leading Europe- an politicians, the cause of this situation is the reduction of EU expenditures on

8D. Shei (2019). Alians pereoriientovuie uvahu na svoiu osnovnu misiiu kolektyvnoi oborony. NATO Reviu 30.09.2019. Pp. 10–19. P. 10 [in Ukrainian].

9A.O. Kalyayev (2020). Oboronozdatnist krain YeS v konteksti suchasnykh problem systemy ko- lektyvnoi bezpeky. Rozvytok publichnoho upravlinnia v Ukraini:materialy nauk.prakt. konferen- tsii LRIDU NADU. Lviv. P. 86–92 [in Ukrainian].

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the army10. Additionally, there is no unity and trust between the participating countries. Moreover, they assess the dangers differently. The European security and defence po- licy has proved ineffective in the face of new challenges and threats, thus the problem of reforming it has become an urgent issue for the EU. All the aforementioned points create obstacles to building a common security strategy. The need for a European defence alliance, which will help NATO, is on the agenda11. The idea of the practical framework for the EU’s Common Defence and Security Policy (CSPD) took shape in June 2016 with the presentation of a new Global Strategy on Foreign and Security Po- licy, which replaced the previous document of 2003. A strategy called “Shared vision, common action: A stronger Europe”12 reflected the collective opinion of the member states and offered a strategic vision of the EU’s global role. It embodied a fresh view on protecting Europe’s common future, which became consolidated for pro-European forces in the European Union. According to the the European Parliament members’ plan, the rapid creation of the European defence alliance in partnership with NATO will allow the EU to act autonomously in operations abroad to stabilize the neighbouring area and enhance its own role as a guarantor of security. The European Parliament’s resolution suggested establishing a Directorate-General for defence, which, at the EU level, would be responsible for the internal aspects of defence and security policy, and also creating a European Intelligence Unit. The developments of the European Commission, the European Parliament and other governing bodies resulted in the adoption of a number of documents, combined in the so-called “Winter Package” on European Security and defence, at a meeting of the EU Council at the level of heads of state and government, which took place in December 2016. (EU Security and defence Winter Package)13. It includes: new policy goals and intentions in the field of security and defence - Implementation Plan of the EU Global Strategy on Security and defence (Implementation Plan on Security and Defence); financial resources defined in the European Defence Action Plan (European Defence Action Plan); a set of proposals for the implementation of the EU-NATO Joint Declaration. Following these decisions, the EU leaders adopted the Rome Declaration, which contains an obligation to form an alliance of EU member states that will help create a more competitive and inte- grated defence industry and strengthen common security and defence in cooperation with, and complementary to, NATO. In early December 2017, the EU Council took

10V. Pashynskyi (2019). Dosvid publichnoho upravlinnia oboronoiu u providnykh krainakh NATO.

Natsionalnyi yurydychnyi zhurnal: teoriia i praktyka. №1. Pp. 102–107 [in Ukrainian].

11O.O. Trush, Ye. M. Nikipielova (2016). Istoryko-pravovi zasady yevropeiskoi polityky bezpeky y oborony. Teoriia ta praktyka derzhavnoho upravlinnia. Vyp. 3. Pp. 30–37. URL: http://nbuv. gov.ua/UJRN/Tpdu_2016_3_7.

12Hlobalna stratehiia iz zovnishnoi ta bezpekovoi polityky. “Spilne bachennia, spilni dii: sylnis-

ha Yevropa” YeS. (2016). URL: https://europa.eu/globalstrategy/en/european-securitystrategy- -secure-europe-better-world.

13The 2016 „Winter Package” on European Security and Defence: Constitutional, Legal and In- stitutional Implications. Manuscript completed on 16 December 2016 © European Union, 2016 This document is available on the internet at: http://www. europarl. europa. eu/supporting-ana- lyses EU Energy Policy: Engaging with Partners beyond Our Borders, Eur-Lex. (no year, n. d. ). URL: http://eurlex. europa. eu/legal-ntent/EN/TXT/?qid=1408370068358.

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a decision to launch the programme Permanent Structured Cooperation (PESCO)

–Permanent structured cooperation of EU member states in the field of defence14. The programme will allow joint countering of Russian military threats and

strengthening of the EU’s defence capabilities, unless disputes between the partici- pants interfere with this. Participation in PESCO is voluntary for all EU member states. Later, in November 2017, Ireland and Portugal joined 23 countries that signed an official statement on expanding cooperation. However, Denmark, Malta and the United Kingdom did not join the new association. The strategy’s main defence goal is to increase the EU’s capacity to act autonomously from NATO, if necessary, to strengthen the Union’s security capabilities by deepening cooperation between mem- ber states for the efficient use of available resources, along with a parallel increase in defence budgets. There is a risk of difficulties and differences in the course of military cooperation between the EU countries, for example, in matters of military contracts distribution, when a certain country receives a defence order. At the moment there are 17 projects designated to train troops, develop combat capabilities, respond to crisis situations, transfer military contingents, strengthen maritime security and respond to cyber threats within PESCO. The official list of types of cooperation includes more than 50 security and defence projects15. As part of the institutionalization of security guidelines, it was proposed to create a separate headquarters to manage all EU ope- rations abroad. In the first stage, the pan-European centre will coordinate the issues of medical care, joint use of transport aviation and exchange of intelligence data. Franco-German initiatives also provided for the full combat readiness of joint tactical combat groups, as well as the introduction of a joint budget for the development and purchase of transport aircraft, satellites, unmanned aerial vehicles (UAV) and cyber means. The first result of such integration initiatives was the formation of the EU Mi- litary Headquarters (Military Planning Conduct and Capability Facility). Although it has not yet become a classic full-fledged military headquarters, it will be responsible for EU military operations. One of the reasons for the new EU defence initiative, PESCO, was President Trump’s unpredictable security policy, Britain’s Brexit, fears that the United States would abandon its NATO commitments, and a desire for grea- ter EU autonomy in European security matters. However, the EU has no plans at all to distance itself from NATO, but instead to deepen cooperation with the alliance. According to experts, without American military-strategic, satellite, reconnaissance capabilities and air defence technologies, Europe is powerless. The implementation of PESCO projects should improve the defence capacity of EU member states, in particular the ability to withstand Russia’s challenges and threats. Today, EU coun- tries solely are not able to guarantee their security in the event of a threat of military conflict, due to the fact that their defence spending and security capabilities do not

14Permanent Structured Cooperation (PESCO) – factsheet. URL: https://eeas.europa. eu/headquar- ters/headquarters-Homepage/34226/permanent-structured-cooperation-pesco-factsheet_en.

15S.O. Aleksandrov. Rozvytok spilnoi zovnishnoi ta bezpekovoi polityky Yevropeiskoho Soiuzu. Perspektyvy dlia Ukrainy // analitychna dopovid. URL: http://old2.niss.gov.ua/content/articles/ files/Aleksandrov-91492.pdf.

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meet modern requirements16. As part of these defence initiatives, the US European Command (USEUCOM) conducted a series of immediate response exercises in Cro- atia, Hungary and Slovenia in 2019. The USEUCOM training series brings together NATO allies and partners to increase interoperability. The purpose of the exercises is to create a trained joint force, ready to perform a full range of military tasks to protect national interests, deter Russian aggression and support a stable and secure Europe.

Thus, over the last year the European Union has managed to move from individual proposals on how to intensify security and defence cooperation to specific approved plans that look quite ambitious. It has already begun to rethink the importance of its own ability to confront threats; it has also gained strategic autonomy and raised the issue of CSDP to the highest level of attention – to the level of heads of state. In addi- tion to political decision-making on the implementation of the Global Strategy, some practical steps have been made to strengthen this security and defence dimension in the EU.17

Firstly, a number of documents, grouped into the so-called “Winter Package” on European Security and defence, were approved. They became the framework for the later adopted plan of “permanent structural cooperation.”

Secondly, the EU has strengthened its defence management structures. The crea- tion of the EU military headquarters has become an initial step towards implementa- tion of the EU Global Strategy.

Thirdly, the creation of the EU military headquarters has provoked expert discus- sions about the creation of a “European army.” Today, it is unlikely that the European Union will take such a step. The formation of a “European army” creates risks of splitting transatlantic unity, as not all EU countries support this idea, and it is extre- mely difficult to draw a demarcation line between EU and NATO powers in the field of security and defence. However, some individual elements of the common security and defence policy are implemented in the European Union in the form of tactical combat groups; expert discussions on the possibility of creating a so-called “defence union” are underway as well.

Fourthly, cooperation between the EU and NATO has intensified, as it was provi- ded for in the Global Strategy. For the European Union, the alliance remains a main- stay in Europe in terms of countering military threats, since no EU member state has sufficient military capabilities. One of the successful examples of EU and NATO co- -operation in modern conditions and in terms of new challenges was the signing by the EU and NATO member states of an agreement, in April 2017, to establish in Helsinki a Centre for Countering Hybrid Threats.

Fifthly, EU countries are forced to reconsider their national defence expenditures. A number of countries have already announced an increase in defence budgets. On June 17, 2019, the defence ministers of Germany, France and Spain approved the largest defence project in Europe – the air combat system of the future, which has

16Ibidem.

17A.O. Kalyayev, O.M. Shapoval (2020). Instytutsionalni problemy bezpeky ta oborony YeS u konteksti rozshyrennia sprivrobitnytstva z Ukrainoiu. Efektyvnist derzhavnoho upravlinnia: zb.nauk.prats LRIDU NADU. Lviv. № 3(64). P. 17–33 [in Ukrainian].

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to be ready for combat use by 2040. The system will not only include combat aircraft but also accompanying drone units, flagship and patrol aircraft, ground stations and satellites. The total cost of the project is estimated at up to 50 billion Euros. Also on the same day, the Foreign and Defence Ministers of all 28 EU countries approved the “EU Global Strategy,” which outlines common defence and security capabilities and considers ways to further strengthen the EU’s role as a global player.

Cooperation between the EU and NATO has intensified, as provided for in the Global Strategy. For the European Union, the alliance remains a mainstay in Europe in terms of countering military threats, as no member country has sufficient milita- ry capabilities. One of the successful examples of cooperation between the EU and NATO in modern conditions and new challenges was the signing in April 2017 by EU and NATO member states of the agreement on the establishment of the Centre for Countering Hybrid Threats in Helsinki.

Conclusions

The world community faces a new type of challenge, the answers to which have not yet been found. It is obvious that the existing system of international security has, in fact, exhausted itself. It is not able to work to prevent threats. At the same time, the urgency of the military threat to European security has increased unprecedentedly. Under these conditions, there is a need to define a new format of cooperation between countries, to develop rules that will serve as the basis for the formation of a new sy- stem of international security. In perspective, NATO should become a basic element of a more global architecture of international security. Its area of responsibility has to be extended and, in certain circumstances, go beyond the borders of its member states. It is expedient and necessary to ensure the unity and compatibility of military- -strategic plans of all EU defence institutions at different levels with NATO along with the establishment of a system of centralized management (joint command), whose decisions should be binding on all countries that are part of the collective defence system. This provides for the possibility of limiting national sovereignty as far as the military-political situation requires. It is important to optimize all defence insti- tutions by informatizing management systems, providing highly qualified managers with experience in crisis management and hybrid threats counteraction organization.

The current “National Security Strategy of Ukraine” provides for integration into the EU and accession to NATO, and, like the “European Security Strategy,” defines the establishment of common human values: “…affirmation of human and civil rights and freedoms, ensuring a new quality of economic, social and humanitarian deve- lopment, ensuring Ukraine’s integration into the European Union and creating condi- tions for joining NATO” one of its main goals18. Taking into account all elements of the current situation, it is advisable for Ukraine to agree to NATO’s proposal for the

18Stratehiia natsionalnoi bezpeky: Ukaz Prezydenta Ukrainy vid 26 travnia 2015 roku № 287/2015.

URL: https://www.president.gov.ua/documents/2872015-19070 [in Ukrainian].

208	Anatoliy Kalyayev

near future and adopt an “associated partnership” format, namely, to pursue a course of maximum rapprochement with NATO without formal accession (Swedish-Finnish version)19. When considering the prospects of deepening cooperation between Ukra- ine and the EU in the field of security and defence, it should be taken into account that the EU Global Strategy on Foreign and Security Policy contains an important direction - “work with key partners, states and regional associations that share EU views.” According to this criterion, Ukraine is an important partner of the European Union in the East. In the strategy our country is mentioned in the “European Security System” section, in the context of countering Russia’s aggression, which confirms its key importance for EU security and determines the prospects for such cooperation.

For Ukraine, the development of autonomous European defence structures opens the possibility for further deepening of cooperation with the EU and parallel strengthe- ning of defence capabilities. Such cooperation is a mutually beneficial process, in the course of which Ukraine contributes to the security of the Euro-Atlantic region, and on the other hand, in the process of training and exercises receives the necessary experience.

Thus, the actual partnership approach to the further development of Ukraine’s coo- peration with the EU in the field of foreign policy and security outlines three areas:

▪▪ cooperation between Ukraine and the EU, both internationally and regionally, for the sake of common security;

▪▪ EU assistance in strengthening Ukraine’s resilience and security; ▪▪ Ukraine’s contribution to European security.

It is obvious that in the future international and regional cooperation between Ukraine and the EU will be based on the full support of Ukraine by the European Union in matters relating to sovereignty, territorial integrity, protection of national in- terests, security of the state and its citizens. In return, Ukraine must support EU policy, adhere to European values and become their supporter regionally, primarily within the framework of the Eastern Partnership. Ukraine’s main contribution to Europe’s security is the strengthening of its own defence capabilities and deterrence of Russian aggression on its eastern borders.

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Summary

Given the new geopolitical challenges and threats, the EU is looking for ways to counter them by reforming its security and defence structures and achieving a high level of consolidation in their management. In this context, the construction of a common EU and NATO policy is an important aspect. It has been shown that effective cooperation between NATO and the EU is the key to developing an integrated approach to crisis management and operations that requires