5The Evolution of Security in Europe at the Beginning of the 21st Century. Selected Aspects 5
5gl;;
Nr 7 ss. 5–24 2022
ISSN 2543–7321 Przyjęto: 05.10.2022
© Instytut Bezpieczeństwa i Zarządzania, Akademia Pomorska w Słupsku Zaakceptowano: 05.10.2022
Oryginalna praca badawcza DOI: 10.34858/SNB.7.2022.001
STUDIA NAD BEZPIECZEŃSTWEM
Andrzej Żebrowski
College of Public Safety and Individual APEIRON
andrzejzebrowski@onet.pl
ORCID: 0000-0002-2779-9444
THE EVOLUTION OF SECURITY IN EUROPE
AT THE BEGINNING OF THE 21ST CENTURY.
SELECTED ASPECTS
EWOLUCJA BEZPIECZEŃSTWA W EUROPIE
NA POCZĄTKU XXI WIEKU.
WYBRANE ASPEKTY
Abstract: Security is a phenomenon that is undergoing constant evolution. The beginning
of the 21st century has brought many changes in the eld of security. This has been inuenced
by, among other things, civilizational changes, the development of technology and a change
in the mentality of society and politicians. In the rst part of the article, the term security
and a historical outline of the changes in international security are indicated. Subsequently,
the factors that have had a signicant impact on the changes in the evolution of security
in Europe are listed and then the current situation in international security is characterised.
Zarys treści: Bezpieczeństwo jest zjawiskiem, które podlega ciągłej ewolucji. Początek XXI
wieku przyniósł wiele zmian w dziedzinie bezpieczeństwa. Wpływ na to miały m.in. zmi-
any cywilizacyjne, rozwój technologii oraz zmiana mentalności społeczeństwa i polityków.
W pierwszej części artykułu wskazano pojęcie bezpieczeństwa oraz zarys historyczny zmian
w bezpieczeństwie międzynarodowym. Następnie wymieniono czynniki, które miały isto-
tny wpływ na zmiany w ewolucji bezpieczeństwa w Europie, a następnie scharakteryzowano
obecną sytuację w zakresie bezpieczeństwa międzynarodowego.
Keywords: security, international security, evolution of international security
Słowa kluczowe: bezpieczeństwo, bezpieczeństwo międzynarodowe, ewolucja bezpieczeństwa
międzynarodowego
The concept of security has evolved over the years and new denitions of it have
been created. Particularly in recent years, due to the development of security sciences,
new denitions and divisions of it are emerging. The evolution of security that has
taken place in recent years and the factors that inuence it are not insignicant. “Secur-
ity in general is a universally understood concept. Like justice, joy, happiness, respect
or love, security contains many personal references. Something that for one person,
6Andrzej Żebrowski
community or nation is happiness or justice for others will mean quite the oppos-
ite. Some people under specic conditions are happy and secure, while others under
the same conditions will be desperate, lost and live with a sense of insecurity. Security
at the level of the individual is generally associated with peace, whereas at higher
levels, e.g. at the national and international levels, we usually associate security
with peace, as the opposite of war.”1
Security is a primordial need of individuals, social groups, nations, states and con-
tinents. It is not a once and for all good. It is subject to evolution, depends on shifting
balances of power and is a function of changes in the global security environment.
Given that it is a process where participants in international relations form a mosaic
of states that are diverse in terms of: aspirations and inuence of a given state on in-
ternational relations, geostrategic, geopolitical, historical, ethnic, national, religious,
cultural and many other conditions – it requires a comprehensive approach taking into
account the scale and dynamics of the changes taking place.
During the period of the bipolar division of the world, security issues were closely
linked: with military policy, with military structures, with armed forces and defence
in the broadest sense. The erosion and collapse of this system was a triumph of Western
politics. However, these transformations bring with them serious international con-
cerns and problems; their development and consequences were probably not foreseen
by the architects of this policy.2 It is worth bearing in mind, however, that all changes,
including those in the modern world, are very complex and cannot be predicted, let
alone their side eects avoided. For we are witnessing progressive globalisation,
which, with the breakdown of the bipolar division of the world, does not encoun-
ter any barriers and is accompanied by systemic, socio-political, cultural, economic
and military transformations with unforeseeable consequences. The development
of organised cross-border crime, terrorism, the phenomena of nationalism, chauvinism
and religious fundamentalism must also be taken into account. The mass movement
of people, knowledge, services, nances and hostile ideas is also an important issue.
It is therefore important to modify the approach to security views in particular, includ-
ing national and international security.
Currently, the concept of security refers to almost all areas of development: polit-
ical, ideological, social, cultural, ethnic, demographic, economic, nancial, access to
natural energy resources, scientic, technical, technological, food, information, in-
formation technology (ICT, cyber), environmental, health and military etc. This cata-
logue is open-ended and will be systematically supplemented with the progress
of civilisation.
“In specic situations individual aspects may be dominant and the order presented
above will not correspond to reality. However, it seems that, regardless of the cir-
cumstances of the environment, the political aspect will always be dominant, if not
at the beginning of the development of the situation, then certainly during. It is worth
1 Gołębiewski, J., National Security of the Republic of Poland, [in:] Universal Rescue System
and Defence and State Security, „Zeszyt Problemowy Towarzystwo Wiedzy Obronnej” 1999,
no. 1, p. 5.
2 Dworecki, S., From conict to war, BUWIK Publishing House, Warsaw 1996, p. 11.
7The Evolution of Security in Europe at the Beginning of the 21st Century. Selected Aspects
noting that, as a general rule, one cannot expect only one aspect of security because
the emergence of any one aspect implies another.”3
The scale and dynamics of the changes occurring in the global security environ-
ment include times of major re-evaluation in social life, the development of tech-
nology and, above all, in the mentality of the population (politicians) and the rise
of civilizational threats also have an impact on the perception of security. All the more
so as security is not only about the will to survive, but also about protecting prosper-
ity and free lifestyles, freedoms and national, ethnic, religious identity and movement
etc. This means that the world has shrunk, we live in a global village and security is
primarily an international category. It is the processes taking place in this environment
(positive and negative) which translate into the level of security: state, local, sub-
regional, regional, supra-regional and global. The space dimension of security should
also be borne in mind, concerning, among other things, protection from asteroids
approaching the Earth.
In terms of the reections carried out, the end of the then political-military
and economic division of the world resulted in major changes and turbulence in
the international security environment and the perception of this qualitatively new
reality. Many states were forced to search for a new security formula in order to move
freely in a high-risk environment in the face of evolving changes in their geopolitical
and geostrategic positions.
It is important to note that the discussion on the new shape of security was
accompanied by serious re-evaluations, among others, in the perceptions of poli-
ticians, whose decisions did not always lead to rational solutions. As a conse-
quence of the decisions taken, the internal and external security systems of states
(including the protection of state secrets) were compromised, which directly trans-
lated into reduced defence budgets and signicant reductions in the armed forces.
This has led to a so-called military stalemate, aecting the current military capabili-
ties of, among others, NATO member states, as pointed out by the former US Pres-
ident (Donald Trump). It can be assumed that his successor, Joe Biden, will uphold
the position of his predecessor. In view of the US presidential election (2020),
the current President, due to the ongoing review of decisions made by the former
President, has put on hold the decision to further withdraw US troops from German
territory. This situation will undoubtedly have an impact on international politics,
relations with NATO and the EU, as well as with Russia and Turkey, and thus on
European and global security.
The processes taking place in the international security space are no longer ac-
companied by information warfare, but by active information warfare, where its
participants, appreciating its importance for their own particular interests, will con-
duct active information activities aimed not only at acquiring information, but also
at disrupting the perception of the object of attack.
With the above in mind, it must be assumed that security must be viewed through
the prism of many complex aspects (internal and external), which are interdependent
3 Gołębiewski, J., National Security..., op. cit., p. 13.
8Andrzej Żebrowski
and have an impact on its level. Security is interdisciplinary and multifaceted
and should be related to all functions of the state and the global security environment.
The asymmetry, turbulence and complexity of the international security environ-
ment characterise the 21st century world. Its determinants are diversity (variety and
varying speed of the processes taking place), complexity (non-linearity and huge
number of processes), volatility (dynamic changes of informational, civilizational,
cultural, nature etc.) and unpredictability (dynamics and non-linearity of processes).4
These are factors that fundamentally aect the current and future international secur-
ity environment. Considerations include globalisation processes, increasingly sophis-
ticated forms of asymmetric warfare, the impact of demographic and environmental
change, states in decay, radical ideologies and uno.esolved conicts.5
Thus, “the concept of security is constantly acquiring new meanings, which are,
of course, accompanied by diversity and even freedom of interpretation. This capa-
city for meaning and interpretation is due not only to the dierent traditions, sizes,
locations and particular interests of states, nor only to the developmental tendencies
of the international community, which are forcing an ever broader understanding
of the concept, but also to its hitherto objective and subjective nature. On the one
hand, security is a state dened by a set of measurable factors and circumstances
subject to rational judgement. On the other hand, it signies the more or less subject-
ive feeling of the nation and the forces governing it that the state is secure or not.
With, of course, a whole range of intermediate feelings.”6
International security (which is a broader concept than state security), on the other
hand, encompasses the external security of individual states and the global system as
a whole. It should be noted that international security is not the sum of the security of
states, as it encompasses both the existential values of individual states and the com-
mon values of the global security system, such as stability, peace, international or-
der, degree of democratisation, cooperativeness, balance and cooperation in various
areas.7 Security is a dynamic process that changes in time and space and is signic-
antly inuenced by the information warfare that always accompanies human action.
It involves information operations in support of all decisions aimed at adhering
(or not adhering) to norms and principles of non-use of force in solving international
problems. This can be military as well as non-military force. Thus, international se-
curity is seen in the category of complex conditionality, which corresponds to diverse
international arrangements.
The historical changes that took place in the international security environment
after the break-up of the bipolar division of the world: the fall of the Berlin Wall
(November 1989) and the reunication of the German states (October 1990); the dis-
solution of the Soviet Union (December 1991); the dissolution of the Warsaw Pact
4 Witecka, M.S., Asymmetric threats and information technologies, “Issue Notebook of the De-
fence Knowledge Society” 2011, no. 4, p. 9.
5 Kozub, M., Strategic security environment in the rst years of the 21st century, AON Publish-
ing House, Warsaw 2009, p. 128.
6 Dworecki, S., From conict to war..., op. cit., p. 12.
7 Pokruszyński, W., Bezpieczeństwo teoria i praktyka, Wydawnictwo Wyższej Szkoły Gospodar-
ki Euroregionalnej, Józefów 2012, p. 69.
9The Evolution of Security in Europe at the Beginning of the 21st Century. Selected Aspects
(July 1991), the Council for Mutual Economic Assistance (June 1991); and the divi-
sion of Czechoslovakia (1992/1993) into two independent states, the Czech Republic
and Slovakia, fundamentally changed the approach to the emerging global security
environment. After the collapse of the Soviet Union many new states were created,
including Belarus, Estonia, Lithuania, Latvia and Ukraine among others, and in its
Asian part (e.g. Georgia, Azerbaijan, Armenia, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Turkmeni-
stan and Uzbekistan). The Commonwealth of Independent States with a dominant
position for Russia has also emerged. It should also be borne in mind that the states
that had lost the protection of the nuclear umbrella of the Soviet Union and its milit-
ary might were faced with a new balance of power, which at that time had yet to see
adequate security structures.
“For the sake of security, in the initial phase of the transition, an attempt was made
to give new importance to the Organisation for Security and Cooperation in Europe
(OSCE). This resulted from both the Paris meeting in 1990 and the Review Confer-
ence in 1992, which had the eect of clarifying cooperation with European organisa-
tions and states. The main European institutions and institutions providing security on
the European continent included the aforementioned Organisation for Security
and Cooperation in Europe, the North Atlantic Alliance (NATO), together with the North
Atlantic Cooperation Council and the Partnership for Peace, which the Alliance had es-
tablished; the European Union (EU); the Western European Union (WEU); the Council
of Europe; and the Commonwealth of Independent States, with its main power, Russia.”8
At the time, it was felt that the above institutions dealing with security issues
should undertake comprehensive activities in accordance with their capabilities.
At the same time, care was taken to ensure that their activities did not conict
with those of other similar organisations.
In the international realities of the time, European and world politicians pos-
ited that there was a limited possibility of an East-West political-military con-
ict. This meant a change in the approach to international security, where security
and peace-keeping issues continued to be prioritised. Under these qualitatively new
conditions, decisions were made in the designated organisations to take them into
account and to develop new rules of operation. Disussions on the new shape
of the European security system continue to this day. Three model concepts of secur-
ity have been identied:
1. collective security under the leadership of the OSCE,
2. European with a dominant role for the European Union,
3. Euro-Atlantic with the North Atlantic Alliance as a key force.
Following the processes taking place, the Organisation for Security and Cooper-
ation in Europe and the European Union have been recognised as a signicant
component of the European security system.
“The OSCE emphasised human rights, the free market and the peaceful settle-
ment of disputes, all of which dominated the Paris Conference in November 1990.
8 Kaczmarek, J., Models of European security, „Zeszyt Problemowy Towarzystwo Wiedzy
Obronnej” 1998, no. 2, p. 6.
10 Andrzej Żebrowski
Considerable progress was made in the elimination, reduction and control of arma-
ments of various classes and categories (Conventional Forces in Europe Agreement
– CFE). The agreement reached on the basis of this treaty made it possible to un-
dertake undertakings verifying the work on the reduction of military equipment and
personnel (e.g. the Clean Sky Agreement).”9
The result of the processes taking place was, among others, the inclusion of
Belarus, Kazakhstan and Ukraine in the programme on: nuclear disarmament,
non-proliferation and strategic arms reduction. For example, “in the rolling of 1993,
158 states signed the Chemical Weapons Convention. In addition, work on the Start I
and Start II treaties was resumed, and work was undertaken on limiting the production
and proliferation of weapons of mass destruction (including their production technolo-
gies). During this period, the Nuclear Test Ban Treaty and the Non-Proliferation Treaty
were adopted, the International Atomic Energy Agency was strengthened, work resumed
on the veriable implementation of the 1972 Biological and Toxin Weapons Conven-
tion, negotiations began on the near completion of the Fissile Material Convention
and missile technology transfer control regimes were expanded.”10
In addition to the work indicated, decisions were made to cut defence budgets,
resulting in reductions in armed forces in all countries. For example, Canada between
1989 and 1999 (by 32%), Italy in the 1990s (by 21%), the Netherlands between 1990
and 2001(by 42.5%), Austria between 1991 and 1995 (by 16%), Sweden by 1999
(by 37%), Poland between 1990 and 1995 (by 37%).11 These trends led to a seri-
ous weakening of these countries’ defence capabilities in the mid-1990s, the eects
of which are still visible today.
It should also be borne in mind that the turn of the 1990s, as a result of signicant
reductions in the armed forces, resulted in changes to the tasks facing the modern
army, with a reduction in its functions.12
In the new liberal conception of the approach to this specic public good of na-
tional defence and the army, governments are attempting to introduce elements
of economic calculus, limiting the military’s area of activity to performing only de-
fence and oensive functions and taking away from it many activities related to lo-
gistics.13 Internal armed and non-armed conicts, ongoing in the international space,
cause armed forces to be engaged in missions and operations conducted in support
of peace. Each of these activities is treated as non-war operations involving interna-
tional components of the armed forces.
9 Gołębiewski, J., Bezpieczeństwo Polski – aspekt międzynarodowy, „Myśl Wojskowa” 2000,
no. 5, p. 5.
10 Ibidem, p. 6.
11 Gołębiewski, J., National Security..., op. cit., p. 10.
12 Żebrowski, A., Wywiad i kontrwywiad XXI wieku, Wydawnictwo Wydziału Administracji Wyż-
szej Szkoły Ekonomii i Innowacji, Lublin 2010, p. 289.
13 Łukaszewicz, A., Afghanistan and Iraq: the economic balance sheet of the war on terrorism,
Warsaw 2010, pp. 73–74.
11The Evolution of Security in Europe at the Beginning of the 21st Century. Selected Aspects
“The decline in the threat of world war and the emergence of the so-called peace
dividend – the possibility of allocating resources previously spent on defence to other
purposes – has resulted, among other things, in signicant reductions in the size of
the armed forces in most European countries and in the United States and Canada.
In the USA alone, the armed forces were reduced from 2.1 million men in 1989
to 1.4 million in 2008. On a larger scale, these processes took place in Russia
and the pro-Soviet states.”14 This meant massive reductions following which
a large group of relatively young, dynamic and well-trained (often with combat ex-
perience) military professionals appeared on the labour market.15 Thus, they natu-
rally became the cadre of private military companies and therefore it can be assumed
that the end of the Cold War contributed to the development of the market for private
military services.
“Private military companies are legal business entities whose activities cover
the international area. They employ personnel to carry out tasks, the details of
which are dened by civil-legal contracts with the client. At the same time, the client
can be either an individual, an organisation or even the government of any country.
One proposed denition to describe private military corporations is as follows: leg-
ally constituted entities that prot from the provision of services of a military nature,
in an organised manner, including training, logistical support, equipment production
and intelligence gathering. These companies are most often covered by contractual
secrecy under threat of cancellation and consequent loss of remuneration. Employees
of military corporations are obliged to full the tasks set before them by their em-
ployers, according to the rules established in accordance with the company’s internal
policies.”16
Another important argument is the processes associated with increasing globalisa-
tion, which include the free movement of people, services, capital, information
and knowledge. These provide the natural conditions for concealing the relationships
that exist between private military and private security companies and other actors.
The demand for such services is also closely related to the growing national and trans-
national concerns that are increasingly relocating their activities to other geographical
areas, sometimes with unstable internal situations.
It should be noted that in many countries the developing market for private
military services has been favourably received, which has made it possible, among
other things, to solve problems related to the management of soldiers discharged
from service.17. This complex process has, however, been accompanied by negative
phenomena related to the supplying of organised transnational criminal groups
and terrorist organisations by dismissed soldiers. It is also important to bear in mind
the transfer of scientists (nuclear physics) from the former Soviet Union to countries
launching their own national nuclear programmes.
14 Uesseler, R., War as a Service. How private military companies destroy democracy, Warsaw
2008, p. 14.
15 Ibidem.
16 Błonko, K., Contractors vis-à-vis Temida, ‘Komandos’ 2009, no. 12, pp. 59–60.
17 Żebrowski, A., Wywiad i kontrwywiad..., op. cit., p. 289.
12 Andrzej Żebrowski
There are many complex reasons for the popularity, growth and involvement
of private companies oering services in the military sphere, such as:
1) the breakdown of the bipolar division of the world and the end of the Cold War;
2) the employers for private military companies are multinationals, which are most
often involved in the extraction of natural resources. Such activities are often
carried out in politically unstable regions, which makes the costs of running
the infrastructure extremely high (including providing security for European
and US personnel). In addition, in some cases, agreements made by govern-
ments with multinational corporations are not accepted by local communities,
often leading to conicts including the use of violence (force). Therefore, ser-
vices to both unstable governments and the aforementioned economic actors
are becoming a motivation for the development of private military services;
3) the execution of government contracts abroad. It should be noted that gov-
ernment contracts executed abroad as a form of military assistance to other
countries are more politically secure, meaning that any failure does not
trigger repercussions. This is also supported by the fact that the employer
is a private civilian company and not the government. Additionally, in the event
of the death or kidnapping of an employee, the fact is less likely to shock
the public. It should be emphasised that private military services are closely
linked to politics and the economy (natural resources) and companies operating in
this sphere are an excellent tool in the hands of state authorities;
4) carrying out government contracts for the benet of its own armed forces.
Private companies for the benet of the armed forces oer a wide range
of services, which include the following: protection of military facilities, imple-
mentation of logistical security activities, training of armed forces and security
in other countries, protection of VIPs, security of infrastructure related to oil
and gas extraction, protection of transport (e.g. money).18
Terrorist attacks, the growth of organised cross-border crime and, above all, armed
conicts (Afghanistan, Africa, South America, the Middle East, Chechnya, Iraq,
Oceania, Syria and Ukraine) are increasing the involvement of private military com-
panies in security tasks.
The security and defence services oered by private companies are very broad.
They include, among others: advising high-level commanders, training in the applica-
tion of new strategies and tactics for action on the modern battleeld, hand-to-hand
combat techniques, learning to operate missile launchers for various purposes with
the use of simulators and demonstrating modern military techniques. Diverse services
also include the latest types of weapons and military equipment (usually of American
production), which is very often related to orders placed with the American arms in-
dustry. In addition, training includes: psychological preparation of personnel for milit-
ary operations, specialised training for special forces, training of state security forc-
es and security personnel. The activities of private military companies also include
18 Żebrowski, A., Wywiad i kontrwywiad..., op. cit., p. 289.
13The Evolution of Security in Europe at the Beginning of the 21st Century. Selected Aspects
security education provided by private universities, where security professionals are
trained in military and non-military spheres to become security ocers or risk managers.
Practical training takes place on the territory of, among others: France, Israel,
the United States and the United Kingdom. Such services also include the protec-
tion of facilities of international organisations, embassies (consulates), diplomatic
and consular sta, business representatives, economic facilities, natural resource ex-
ploitation sites, protection of transmission infrastructure and hydrocarbon extraction
sites and military hostage-taking operations etc.
The unfolding negative phenomena in the global security environment require
increasing investment in protection which, for private military companies, means
expanding the range of services provided. Such an example is the range of ser-
vices oered which includes security and armed protection in all crisis situations
on land, sea and in the air.19 The services oered include maritime security tasks
that include: combat operations, apprehending smugglers, protecting vessels
with armed underwater search teams and security training for the entire crew.
The service is the prevention of unlawful seizure of a waterborne vessel (mainly com-
mercial and container vessels).20 Protection against hijacking and the release of hostag-
es, ghting organised crime, money laundering and human tracking are also among
the services they oer.21 Another oering is the so-called Intelligence sector, related
to intelligence and espionage activities. Developments in ICT and communication
techniques mean that there is a demand for services concerning interception
and eavesdropping on electromagnetic signals as well as on Internet communication
and e-mail.22 The sector also deals with image-based reconnaissance, which enables
the production of reconnaissance data on the basis of imaging from photographs, radio
locators, infrared and thermal electro-optical instruments and other devices.23 Particu-
larly noteworthy is the conduct of personal penetration of the information space with
the participation of agents. In addition, intelligence activities include: client protec-
tion, guarding, analysing the possible risk of an attack and planning action strategies.
An example of a company that set the course for private military services in
the future (globally) was the company Executive Outcomes (EO), which was founded
in 1990 in South Africa. The facts speak for themselves:
– rstly, it was one of the rst private military companies in general;
– secondly, EO was something new in that it was constructed around
the company’s empire;
– thirdly, EO was admittedly a small, but complete, autonomous private army.
The scope of its services was comprehensive and included: advice, training, coach-
ing, direct participation of combat units in combat, provision of armaments, logistics,
19 Uesseler, R., War as a Service..., op. cit., p. 44.
20 Ibidem, p. 45.
21 Ibidem, p. 45.
22 Ibidem, p. 47.
23 Nowacki, G., US and Russian Federation satellite recognition, AON Publishing House, War-
saw 2002, p. 54.
14 Andrzej Żebrowski
technical supervision, intelligence and counter-intelligence security, as well as
physical protection. Its autonomy also stemmed from having its own weapons,
its own reconnaissance system (including intelligence services), supply bases
and transport system. Within the structure of Executive Outcomes, there were the fol-
lowing organisational (executive) units: oil and gas production, geophysical, hydroge-
ological and water drilling expertise, investment and consulting for industrial plants,
air transport, airlines, exports, imports, customs, engineering, infrastructure, logistics,
NGO support services, advertising agency, advertising companies and tourism.24
Another example is the US private military company “Kellog, Brown & Root,
oering logistics, procurement and technical supervision services during peacekeep-
ing operations carried out by US troops since June 1999. American soldiers were
provided with: more than one billion hot meals and more than 200 billion litres
of water, one billion litres of gasoline and disposed of more than 90,000 cubic
metres of rubbish. The services provided also included construction, transportation,
engineering, technical supervision of buildings and their equipment, road construc-
tion, provision of electricity, water and gasoline, foodstus, cleaning of clothes
and delivery of correspondence. It turns out that without the services of this company,
US soldiers could neither eat nor sleep, and could not carry out their tasks due to
the lack of fuel, weapons and ammunition supplies.”25
“The main driving force behind the process of privatising security and outsourc-
ing military services in the US was the defence budget cuts that followed the end of
the so-called Cold War. The military came to the conclusion that the army would save
money when certain tasks not directly related to the conduct of military operations
– such as procurement, transportation, protection of property and persons or logistics
in the broadest sense – were transferred to private entities. [...] The most memorable
were the mercenaries involved in the protection of VIPs and important facilities. Pri-
vate soldiers, for example, often had nothing to do with Iraqi law and ordinary Iraqis.
They covered themselves in grim glory in their willingness to pull the trigger. Four se-
curity guards from the notorious Blackwater company were sentenced to years in prison
for orchestrating a bloody ght in the streets of Baghdad.”26 It is worth bearing in mind
that the Pentagon is the largest employer for the private military companies it uses.
“It appears that no operation of the US armed forces can now take place without
the support of civilian personnel. As the situation in regions of interest to the US admin-
istration escalates, their numbers will increase. And who says war is not conducive to
doing business?”27
The next country that uses private military companies in the implementation of its
foreign policy is Russia. “They are involved in conicts in the former Soviet Union,
as well as where it has important political and economic interests – mainly in the Middle
24 Uesseler, R., War as a service..., op. cit., p. 103.
25 Ibidem, pp. 99–100.
26 Bednarzak, T., Private military companies are getting rich from the war against ISIS, https://wi-
adomosci.wp.pl/prywatne-rmy-wojskowe-bogaca-sie-nawar-with-isis6025270123840129a,
[accessed: 29.05.2020].
27 Ibidem.
15The Evolution of Security in Europe at the Beginning of the 21st Century. Selected Aspects
East and North Africa. Between several hundred and up to three thousand Russian
employees of private military companies are present in each of these places. They are
also employed by Russian state corporations such as: Gazprom, Rosatom, Rosneft,
Russian Railways – to protect resource extraction sites and networks, construction
sites or to convoy transports in African, South American and Middle Eastern coun-
tries. In addition, countries such as Syria and Libya, when asked to protect hydrocar-
bon extraction sites and transmission infrastructure, oer a signicant (25–30%) share
of the contracts concluded for the sale of energy raw materials, giving private military
companies signicant revenues.”28
It is worth bearing in mind that the asymmetric international security environment
will continue to evolve towards widening dierences in civilizational development.
Existing and emerging threats primarily relate to deliberate human activity aimed at
destroying adversaries. These adversaries are not only societies, but also their natu-
ral environments, which is being degraded (very often irreversibly) through progres-
sive erosion. These conditions include many states which, in pursuit of their particu-
lar interests, are involved in a race to access modern technologies used to control
and consequently, take control of the international security environment. Accordingly,
they will conduct oensive information operations by, among other things, engaging
private military companies. They will continue to use information operations to inu-
ence the situation in other states. They will continue to support arms supply, train-
ing and operations in the personal and technical information space. Private military
companies are an important tool of international inuence; through them states are
able to exert political and military inuence in regions of interest (conicts, political
and military instability), without ocially committing their own armed forces. Given
the scale and scope of operations (including information operations) by private mil-
itary companies, further conicts between them and the armed forces and private forms
of other states with interests in the region should not be ruled out.
“Private military companies (PFWs) operate in most (around 110) countries in
the world. Of the 30 most important, the largest number were established and are based
in the USA and the UK. Their activity is mainly visible in places of armed conict or
where the political and social situation is unstable. Their activities are generally co-
ordinated with the foreign policy objectives of the country of origin. The most important
tasks include: securing the activities of regular armed forces (logistical security, con-
voy protection), training, protection of facilities and people. They work for both state
and private entities. They are also used by UN agencies – UNICEF, World Food Pro-
gramme (WFP), Development Programme, International Red Cross, among others.”29
It is worth bearing in mind that members of private military companies are act-
ive participants in the ongoing global information conict. This is supported
by the penetration of the personal and technical information space in the course
of intelligence and counter-intelligence operations. Information operations are
28 Dyner, A.M., The importance of private military companies in Russia’s foreign policy, PISM,
4 May 2018, https://www.pism.pl/publikacje/Znaczenie_prywatnych_rm_wojskowych_w_
polityce_zagranicznej_Rosji, [accessed: 29.05.2020].
29 Ibidem.
16 Andrzej Żebrowski
most often clandestine in nature because they very often secure the activities
of the regular components of the armed forces of countries involved in armed con-
icts, or provide logistical security for military-civilian participants in peace support
operations.
Observation of this global services market allows one to hypothesise that private
military companies have been able to grow to the point where they have, in a sense,
displaced state security structures30 from the space of many states. This situation
in the private security market will further intensify as states have generally lost
their monopoly on the internal and external security of the state.
An important aspect of current geopolitics is the dynamic changes in the global se-
curity environment. States that have freed themselves from the pressures exerted by
the leaders of political-military blocs have become the target of rabid and pervas-ive
propaganda. The transformations that followed brought them under the inuence of
globalisation processes. The mass movement of peoples causes cultures and religions to
mix, which is the source of numerous problems. The cultural and religious specicities
mean that the internal security of many countries is under threat. Cultures are changing,
the standards of which were once clearly dened. In the culture of the 21st century, ideas,
images and symbols are constantly evolving, from which only a few elements can be
grasped. This conditioning means access to more and more information.
We are seeing an increasing role for national and religious factors, which have
a very strong emotional impact. Fuelled and properly directed, they take the form of
nationalism and xenophobia, which is evident in many countries. There is a source of
danger where the use of accumulated military potentials can give rise to rash decisions.
Global propagandists are aware of this, which is used in the organisation
and conduct of psychological warfare. It is accepted that the basis for the eectiveness
of information conicts is the use of force over a long distance in the shortest pos-
sible time. Such possibilities are provided by modern ICT, communication technology
and the Internet. These tools allow synchronisation and coordination of actions taken in
the political, social, economic and military spheres, where the terrain of confrontation
is cyberspace. This allows interference in the internal aairs of other states, depriving
the opponent of the will to ght. Skilfully conducted propaganda, taking into account
the cultural and religious factor, can lead to the decomposition of the existing order
in the sphere of security in states, regions and sub-regions. The rapid development
of information technology is fundamentally changing people and their environment.
It increases the ow of information, which allows oensive parties greater
opportunities to inuence the consciousness of the object of attack. In this process,
the adversary takes into account, among other things:
1) human-information-technology relationships that are changing people’s beha-
viour, habits and also their way of thinking,
2) human-society relations, where there are undoubtedly generational dierences,
which aect the perception of the security environment (individual, social
group, nation and state).
30 Scahill, J., Blackwater, Wydawnictwo Dolnośląskie, Wrocław 2007, pp. 88–93.
17The Evolution of Security in Europe at the Beginning of the 21st Century. Selected Aspects
A condition for the occurrence of change is the developing information and com-
munication systems, which increases the possibilities for information aggression.
Therefore, in a world dominated by information warfare, it is necessary to try to un-
derstand the internal and external environment (near and far) of the state, the processes
taking place there, but also oneself. Furthermore, it is also necessary to understand
the information activity (including intellectual activity) of the adversary and the re-
lationships occurring in order to be able to more easily decipher the challenges (op-
portunities and threats) to the security of the individual, social group, nation and state.
The great unknown for the level of international security is the election of Joe
Biden as President of the United States. Four key questions arise: will he continue
the aggressive foreign policy of his predecessor? Will he change the existing US
National Security Strategy and War Doctrine? Will the policy be rational from
the point of view of the global information space? These and many other questions
concerning this area are likely to dominate the international political scene supported
by information operations. The pandemic and the new US president, are key issues
for the international security environment, and this space will evolve in fundamental
ways. An evolving international security environment includes intensied negative
co-option by key players in international relations and global information warfare.
We are witnessing how the dominant position of the United States on a global
scale is being threatened by other states (e.g. China, Russia, Turkey and Iran) that
seek to participate in shaping international security. “The foreign policy of the US
administration (under President Trump) has fundamentally changed the balance of
power at the time. The emergence of new players – strong above all militarily (holders
of nuclear weapons) – threatened US hegemony. This qualitatively dierent situation
was reected in US military policy, which was reected in the country’s new national
security documents and war doctrine.”31
However, the ongoing changes in the global information space following the US
presidential election, and the decisions made by President Biden, indicate that it is the
continued policies of former President Trump which pose a threat to not only regional,
but to global security. Continued policies take the form of concrete decisions and ac-
tions, such as:
1) The redeployment of four B-1 aircraft to Orlent airbase in Norway. This is
a very important airbase where military aircraft, search and rescue heli-
copters and E-3A SENTRY AWACS aircraft are based. This base can accom-
modate 95,000 personnel at a time. B-1 US strategic bombers with variable
wing geometry can carry a wide range of conventional and nuclear bombs
and missile weapons in three internal bomb bays and on six external hard
points. It is expected they will carry nuclear weapons in the form of B28, B61
and B83 bombs and missiles.
31 Żebrowski, A., Security and defence of the United States under President Trump, [in:]
M. Winiarczyk-Kossakowska, S. Saletra-Półgrabi, P. Skorut (eds.), NATO w dwadzieścia lat po
akcesji, Ocyna Wydawnicza ASPRA-JA, Warszawa 2020, p. 281.
18 Andrzej Żebrowski
2) February 2021 saw the largest exercise since July 2020 in the South China Sea,
with the US deploying two strike groups: the aircraft carriers USS Theodore
Roosevelt and USS Nimitz. Relations between China and the US have been
strained for several years. Under President Trump the US started a trade war
with China and now the US is accusing Beijing of human rights violations
by persecuting Uighurs and other Muslims in Xinjiang. There are intersect-
ing interests in the South China Sea: China, Taiwan, Vietnam, the Philippines,
Malaysia, the Sultanate of Brunei and the US.
3) US President Joe Biden has stated that the United States will not lift sanctions
against Iran until the country’s authorities halt uranium eno.ichment. This is
a condition for the United States to rejoin the 2015 Vienna Accords, signed
by Tehran and the superpowers (the US, China, Russia, France and the UK),
which aimed to prevent Iran from developing a nuclear bomb and for the coun-
try’s nuclear programme to remain civilian and peaceful. Iran’s nuclear activ-
ities were intensied in response to US sanctions.
4) Very dangerous is the statement by US President Biden, who announced
that he is going to confront Russian President Putin. Such a stance, combined
with the existing documents adopted by his predecessor (National Security
Strategy and War Doctrine) and the redelivery of B-1 aircraft to Norway, should
be seen as the beginning of a confrontation, which may result in the intensication
of the already ongoing arms race, the formation of new political-military
alliances (e.g. Russia-China, Russia-India and Russia-Turkey), the intensica-
tion of the activities of NATO member states on the eastern ank, an increase
of the US military presence in Europe, the admission of new members to
the Alliance (e.g. Ukraine and Georgia), an increase of economic sanctions
against Russia – which may take the form of economic warfare, an increase in
the number of military operations against Russia, intensied pressure by the
United States on NATO and European Union member states to renounce eco-
nomic cooperation with an emphasis on natural gas supplies from Russia, ex-
pansion of NATO infrastructure in countries bordering Russia and Belarus, in-
creased intelligence penetration and intensied psychological action supported
by information operations by both Russia and the United States etc. President
Biden’s position has and will continue to have a signicant impact on the level
of regional, sub-regional and global security.
5) April 2021 is when the political activity of the United States in Central
and Eastern Europe, where an open information war with Russia in the po-
litical sphere due to the accumulation of signicant forces and resources near
the border with Ukraine by the Russian side, led to a so-called war of nerves.
The US side most likely did not withstand the pressure of Russia’s information
and military activity (exercises of the Western and Southern Military Districts,
after which the troops returned to their permanent location sites), which, among
other things, was treated by the countries bordering Ukraine as a threat of
an imminent outbreak of an armed conict. This demonstration of military force
19The Evolution of Security in Europe at the Beginning of the 21st Century. Selected Aspects
can be seen as probing the behaviour of the actors in international relations
with particular reference to the USA. The announcement and subsequent
withdrawal of President Biden’s decision to engage in the Black Sea basin
by sending two warships may indicate an avoidance of an escalation of ten-
sions between Washington and Moscow. Noteworthy is the US President’s of-
fer to meet with President Putin in a third country to discuss the full range
of issues facing the US and Russia. However, the decisions and actions were
accompanied by nervousness, resulting in an intensied information battle in
the political sphere (supported by the intelligence services of the parties in-
volved). “The White House communicated on 15 April 2021 that President Joe
Biden had signed an executive order imposing additional sanctions on Russia
over its interference in the 2020 US election and hacking attacks. In addition
to expelling 10 diplomats, under the new sanctions the US banned US nan-
cial institutions from trading in Russian bonds and named six companies as
partners of Russian services in hacking attacks. In addition, personal sanctions
were introduced against 32 individuals implicated in attempts to interfere in
the 2020 US election.”32 “The head of Russian diplomacy announced that Russia
had expelled 10 US diplomats. This is to respond to the expulsion from
the US of 10 Russian diplomats suspected of espionage. Lavrov added
that the Russian authorities will prohibit the employment of Russian citizens
and third-country nationals in US diplomatic representations. In addition, Russia
will break with the practice of not limiting the entry of US State Department
and other US ministry employees for short business visits to US diplomatic
representations in Russia. Lavrov announced that Russia will propose annual
parity, such as the introduction of a rule that one Russian employee may enter
the US and 10 US employees may enter Russia.”33 In addition, “Lavrov
announced that Russia would ban US NGO foundations that interfere in Russian
domestic politics. He warned that Russia could take painful measures against
American businessmen.”34 In a later announcement they said they were imposing
sanctions on eight current and former US government ocials. The politicians
included US Director of National Intelligence Avril Haines, Attorney General
Merrick Garland, Department of Homeland Security chief Alejandro Mayork-
as, former White House National Security Advisor John Bolton and former CIA
chief James Woolsey.35 It is important to emphasise that in this confrontation
in the political sphere, supported by information operations, the United
States is using dependent countries that are members of NATO. Countries
such as Poland, the Czech Republic and Slovakia are taking unfriendly steps
towards Russia, in consultation with representatives of the US Department,
32 Lavrov: we will expel 10 US diplomats, ambassador should return to US for consultations,
https://tvn24.plswiat/rosja-zapowiada-wydalenie-amerykanskich-dyplomatow-siergie-lawrow
-sugeruje-ze-ambasador-usa-powinien-wyjechac, [accessed: 24.04.2021].
33 Ibidem.
34 Ibidem.
35 Ibidem.
20 Andrzej Żebrowski
leading to the expulsion of Russian diplomats. Following this, the Russian
side expelled diplomats of the countries indicated. The Czech side accused
Russian diplomats of being GRU members who were complicit in the blowing up
of explosive magazines in 2014. The revelation of the incident comes after
seven years, where a Bulgarian trail leading to an arms tracker (Gebrev)
and his links to Ukraine are indicated. The Bulgarian side reported that the said
arms dealer was buying explosives from a Czech warehouse on the day the ex-
plosion took place. At the same time, there was also an explosion of explosives
in a warehouse located on Bulgarian territory, which is also suspected to have
been carried out by ocers of the Russian military intelligence service GRU.
Bulgaria, being in conict with Russia, expelled Russian diplomats in 2019
on charges of espionage.
6) In the ongoing US-Russian political conict, in addition to the countries
already mentioned, Lithuania, Latvia and Estonia have also expelled Russian
diplomats, thus showing their support for the US side. This is very dangerous,
all the more so as the countries involved, despite being members of NATO,
have small economic and defence potential. Moreover, such an attitude shows
absolute subordination to the US.
7) These events involve not only the ocial bodies of the above-mentioned states,
i.e. foreign ministries, supported by intelligence services, which may mean
that these events are the result of intelligence games played by the main ben-
eciaries (the United States and Russia). Observation of the processes taking
place, i.e. the US-Russia relationship, as well as the use of dependent states,
gives global international relations a qualitatively new dimension. The ongo-
ing information war and the political decisions taken by its participants in its
aftermath have an impact on the level of security not only in Europe but also
globally. It can be assumed that its consequences will be felt primarily
by states that are tools of the United States. These events are accompanied
by a statement made by a representative of the US embassy in Warsaw (April
2021), who stated that the US will not allow the completion of Nord Stream-2.
This means that tension between the US and Russia will persist and decisions
taken against Russia may lead to its escalation. If the US side, exploiting its po-
sition in the global security environment and supported by its military potential,
and involving dependent states in encircling Russia, a multifaceted response
from the Russian side is to be expected. It can be assumed that the strategic
objective is to take control of energy resources located in the Russian Fed-
er-a-tion’s sphere of responsibility.
* * *
The state of international security is also aected by events elsewhere in
the world, such as the ongoing conict between Ukraine and Russia, where the United
States is not only politically involved but supports the Ukrainian side with weapons.
The course of this conict is also important for the security of the Black Sea basin
countries (Bulgaria, Georgia, Russia, Romania and Turkey), the Sea of Azov (Russia
21The Evolution of Security in Europe at the Beginning of the 21st Century. Selected Aspects
and Ukraine) – a disputed area between the countries indicated and the Caspian Sea
(Kazakhstan, Russia, Turkmenistan, Iran and Azerbaijan). The Black Sea is important
for the global economy due to the large oil deposits underneath its sea bed and which
is the cause of disputes over the division of waters between littoral states.
The Ukraine-Russia conict has fundamentally changed the situation in the Black
Sea basin, where the European Union, NATO and also the United States have in-
terests. It is worth pointing to the EU, which has strategic economic goals
and treats the region as an attractive market. The Black Sea region is also important
for Europe’s energy security as it is located on the transit route for oil and gas from
the Caspian Sea area and the whole of Central Asia.36 It should also be borne in mind
that the Black Sea is a transport link from Asia to Europe, which is considered a route
of movement for international terrorist organisations, transnational criminal groups
involved in illegal migration, drug smuggling, arms tracking and money laundering
etc., which is important for the security of the European Union and NATO member
states. It is also a region of political instability with ethnic, cultural and religious
issues between Armenia and Azerbaijan over Nagorno-Karabakh, in Georgia Abkhazia
and South Ossetia, Moldova Transnistria and Russia Chechnya. Russia’s cooperation
with Turkey is also important, including at the military level. For example, Turkey’s
purchase of the Russian S-400 system is the subject of a Turkish-American conict
resulting in Turkey’s exclusion from the F-35 combat aircraft programme. It should be
noted that Turkey, being a member of NATO, has the strongest army in the structures
of this organisation. It turns out that the problem is more complex, because in
the Black Sea basin both the states of the region and states and international organisa-
tions from outside the region have interests:
1) Western states, the United States, NATO and the European Union, which pro-
vide political, social and military assistance to countries in the region. The US
and the EU want to take control of the region;
2) Russia and Turkey, the strongest states in the region, which seek to maintain
their economic, military and political position in the region;
3) Ukraine, Bulgaria, Romania and the Caucasus countries.
In the foreign policy process, Turkey maintains contacts with the Muslim states
of Central Asia (Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Turkmenistan and Uzbekistan),
which may have an impact on the shaping of security policy in the Middle East
and Central Asia; it also maintains contacts with the Shanghai Cooperation Organisa-
tion, and thus with China and Russia. From the point of view of economic interests,
the Bulgarian branch of the Turkish Stream pipeline, which runs from the Turkish to
the Serbian border, should be kept in mind. It is intended to ensure the ow of Russian
natural gas from Turkey, to which it is supplied via a pipeline under the Black Sea,
to Serbia and via there on to Hungary, Austria and Slovakia.
36 Kobieracka, A., Shanghai Cooperation Organisation as one of the forms of multifaceted coop-
eration between Russia and the People’s Republic of China, “Polskie Studium Politologiczne”,
2017, no. 54, pp. 371–373.
22 Andrzej Żebrowski
The security and stability of the Black Sea region depends on the position of Russia
and Turkey, countries that will seek to pursue economic and military policies
in line with their own interests. The interests of the United States, the European
Union, NATO, as well as the Muslim states of the region and members of the Shanghai
Cooperation Organisation should also be kept in mind.
It turns out the Black Sea’s problems are primarily related to its oil resources.
For example, Ukraine has been in talks with the world’s largest energy companies,
Exxon Mobil and Royal Dutch Shell, about drilling south-west of Crimea. These two
companies are also interested in exploiting the Skifska eld, which stretches from
the western coast of the Crimean peninsula to the coast of Romania. Today, exploit-
ation is in question.
The emerging balance of power and international developments indicate
that the collective eorts of UN member states, as well as non-state actors, do not always
contribute to avoiding conicts in the military and non-military spheres. It is worth
bearing in mind that the development of international relations continues to take
place in a pattern of political, ideological, cultural, economic, scientic and technical
rivalry, although the military factor is increasingly decisive. The shift of NATO
troops towards the east and the development of the organisation’s military infra-
structure are forcing Russia to make certain counter-movements of a military na-
ture (strengthening the Western Military District and the Kaliningrad enclave with
new means of precision destruction). The ongoing armed conicts, the ongoing
arms race, the milit-ary presence in various geographical regions (military bas-
es), are constant tensions which, if they escalate, could lead to a conict of much
greater scope.
In the global security environment, talks, consultations (bilateral and multilateral),
the inuence of the UN, as well as informal actors (politicians, businessmen, scien-
tists, social organisations), as well as mass demonstrations related to the violation
of democracy, the rule of law, mass migrations and the ongoing information war,
with varying results, do not inspire optimism. There are still states which, from
the position of their potential: economic, scientic and technical, information technology,
and above all military potential (possessors of WMD), shape the level of regional
and also global security by conducting large-scale information operations. In addi-
tion to the problems signalled, in all elds of human activity, the military activities
of states that are not only members of specialised political-military and nancial-
economic organisations, but also states that have a nuclear triad and/or are developing
their own nuclear and ballistic missile programmes, should be recognised and ration-
ally assessed. The armed forces of many participants in international relations show
a constant trend of increasing war potential, especially in terms of qualitative
improvement of the means of physical destruction. These activities are accom-
panied by the evolution of strategic and operational assumptions, as well as increased
nancial and economic eorts, which directly translates into the modernisation
of the armed arsenals of individual states. This process is accompanied by the activities
of organised cross-border crime, oriented towards the tracking of weapons,
23The Evolution of Security in Europe at the Beginning of the 21st Century. Selected Aspects
components for the production of WMD, radioactive materials and their means of
delivery, dual-use technology and other materials for use on the battleeld etc.
In the global space of international security there are still many causes, phenom-
ena and conditions which, due to their diversity and complexity, not only have not
resolved the contradictions to date, but continue to be a source of increasing antag-
onism between highly developed states, states aspiring to superpower status (includ-
ing regional ones), as well as states seeking to preserve and consolidate their dominant
inuence.
Existing political, cultural, social, economic and military relations between coun-
tries, as well as diering access to natural energy resources and safe drinking water
supplies, have a key impact on the existing (not entirely sustainable) global security
system. The existing disparities in the level of development must also be borne in
mind, and they will widen with the processes taking place. They will be the source
of many conicts of varying backgrounds, scale and destructive force.
Such an alignment of political, economic and military forces on a global scale,
with the ambiguous cocksure attitude of many states and the ongoing information war,
means that we live with a permanent threat shaping our daily lives.
Every action requires access to certain information, which means that global secu-
rity is closely linked to the personal and technical information space, where conducted
communications are of interest to many state and non-state actors, and organisations
that violate international and national law. Their penetration allows building scenarios
as to the next steps in strengthening the security environment of the state, region
and sub-region. The development of international relations, supported by information
oper-tions, continues to take place in a system of negative cooperation in the ideolo-
gical, political, social, cultural, economic and scientic-technical spheres. Increas-
ingly, however, the military factor is decisive. These processes are accompanied
by the evolution of existing strategic assumptions, operational assumptions, budgets,
as well as the constant modernisation of armed arsenals.
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Summary
The article identies the problem of dening security. In addition, the changes that have
occurred in international security at the turn of the 20th and 21st centuries are characterised.
The nal part of the article describes the current situation that aects international security.
